Campaign Diary: Why the Yes Side Lost

Originally published in Vancouver Courier.

In 2004 during the last week of June, then four-term city councillor Sam Sullivan invited me to join his campaign team for the “no” side in the October referendum to approve a ward system for Vancouver.

It was a daunting challenge as I recall. Our campaign war chest was empty, we had no identified voters, and public support for wards was off the charts according to recent opinion polls.

But four months later we won convincingly — 54 per cent opposed to a ward system versus 46 in favour.

An ingredient for our success was undoubtedly our head start on the better resourced Yes campaign, which only kicked off after the Labour Day weekend.

It is no wonder that I am having déjà vu after watching the multi-million dollar “Yes” campaign by the Mayors’ Council (responsible for regional transportation) go down in flames.

It was April 2013 when the B.C. Liberals announced their platform plank saying that voters must pass any new TransLink funding formula.

Some have argued that the mayors lacked time to convince voters. In reality, they had the time but spent much of it trying and failing to convince the premier to back down from a campaign pledge.

That was just the first mistake of many by the Yes side.

At the start, things looked hopeful for the mayors. A December 2014 Insights West poll showed the pro-tax Yes side leading by 13 points. A strong campaign going forward could have secured a win.

It was on Dec. 11, the same day the Mayors’ Council released the details of the transit plebiscite, that Jordan Bateman and the Canadian Taxpayers Federation launched their No Transit Tax campaign.

Where were the No side’s opponents? Incredibly, it would be another two months until the Yes campaign officially launched on Feb. 2.

By then Bateman’s tiny campaign was already in high gear with a strong website and potent message about TransLink waste.

With money, campaign staff and voter lists, the Yes side was likely confident they could overtake Bateman.

In mid-January, the Vancouver mayor’s office convinced the Mayors’ Council to appoint Gregor Robertson and Surrey mayor Linda Hepner as chair and vice-chair respectively.

It was argued that new, high profile leadership was needed to secure a win, so they bumped off the incumbent chair, North Vancouver District Mayor Richard Walton.

1297671194954_ORIGINALWith Mayor Gregor and his chief of staff Mike Magee now calling the shots, Vision Vancouver campaigners were handed key roles inside the Yes side’s war room.

Between the Yes and No camps there was an interesting distinction. Disciples of low taxes and small government ran the No campaign. By comparison the Yes side was staffed by hired guns.

In political campaigns I always watch for those — like Bateman — who are most committed to the cause.

On Feb. 11, the first big change overseen by Vancouver’s mayor was the sacking of TransLink CEO Ian Jarvis.

With that fateful decision, Robertson gave his opponents their best ammunition of the campaign and refocused the public’s attention on problems within the transportation authority.

The No side probably pinched themselves with delight at the news.

The considerable support for the Yes side that existed in December had all but evaporated by mid-February, and would never return.

By March it had been three months since the mayors had announced the plebiscite question. Now running from behind, the Yes side heard advice from many (including myself) that a bold step was needed to gain the voters’ trust.

In response, the Yes campaign appointed multi-billionaire Jimmy Pattison as head of a proposed spending oversight committee. Leveraging the business leader’s reputation looked to most observers as a cynical move to save the Yes side, however, and the announcement fell flat.

Instead of revising their flailing campaign strategy, the Yes side stuck with a traditional “air war” that included telephone town halls, emails, as well as costly TV, radio, and print advertising.

They peppered their pro-tax message with gloomy forecasts of gridlock and economic stagnation if the vote failed. They also attempted to discredit Bateman by attacking him personally — one of several strategies that failed to persuade voters.

With the loss the Yes side campaign has tried to spin the vote as unwinnable, when it was really a colossal failure on their part.

It is unlikely, however, that the political insiders paid to run it are complaining much.